The Species Problem: A Philosophical Analysis ( Studies in Philosophy and Biology) | Date: 21 April 2011, 05:07
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There is long-standing disagreement among systematists about how to divide biodiversity into species. Over twenty different species concepts are used to group organisms, according to criteria as diverse as morphological or molecular similarity, interbreeding and genealogical relationships. This, combined with the implications of evolutionary biology, raises the worry that either there is no single kind of species, or that species are not real. This book surveys the history of thinking about species from Aristotle to modern systematics in order to understand the origin of the problem, and advocates a solution based on the idea of the division of conceptual labor, whereby species concepts function in different ways - theoretically and operationally. It also considers related topics such as individuality and the metaphysics of evolution, and how scientific terms get their meaning. This important addition to the current debate will be essential for philosophers and historians of science, and for biologists.
The species idea
Species are kinds of living things. This way of thinking about life seems to go back at least to Plato and Aristotle, who used the term eidos that meant in one sense, the appearance or form of a thing. For the naturalists who came after, species were also the relatively distinct groupings of individual organisms that were more or less similar in appearance and behavior, and that sometimes interbred. Since the development of a hierarchical taxonomy by Linnaeus in the eighteenth century, those organisms that had been grouped into species taxa were then grouped into more inclusive categories – genera, orders, classes, and ultimately kingdoms. Because species are the most basic groupings of organisms in this hierarchy, they are now usually regarded as the fundamental units of biodiversity. But for contemporary biologists steeped in evolutionary theory, species are much more. Darwinian evolution tells us that species are the things that are “born” in speciation from other species, change over time, produce new species, and ultimately “die” in extinction. Species are therefore also the fundamental units of evolution.
The idea of species has played a similarly significant role in philosophy. Philosophers have followed the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, as they understand it, and have treated those groups of organisms we identify as species as natural kinds with essences. In doing so, they have treated biological species as equivalent to chemical elements such as hydrogen and oxygen, and molecular kinds, such as water, that are made up of these elements. Biological species have in this way fit into a philosophical way of thinking known as metaphysics, which studies the basic, fundamental things and processes that exist. On this traditional essentialist approach, biological species, like hydrogen, oxygen and water, are the fundamental and eternal kinds of things we find in nature. And when we divide nature into species, elements and molecular kinds, we are, in the oft-paraphrased words of Plato, “cutting nature at its joints.” But Darwinian evolution has seemed by many to challenge this idea that species are natural kinds with essences. Most obviously, evolution implies that species can no longer be regarded as eternal and unchanging. If so, then how do species fit into our philosophical understanding of the world? The philosophical significance of this idea of species extends into our understanding of human nature. In the essentialist tradition, humans have a nature because they belong to the species-kind human. In more modern terms, humans are the way they are by virtue of being members of the species Homo sapiens. The idea of human nature is therefore dependent on our ideas of what it means to be a member of a species. In the past this might have meant an understanding based on the essence of being human. But with the Darwinian challenge to this traditional picture, we also get a challenge to traditional ways of thinking about human nature. If evolution forces us to rethink the nature of species, perhaps we must also rethink the nature of human nature.
Contents
Acknowledgments page x
1 The species problem 1
2 The transformation of Aristotle 17
3 Linnaeus and the naturalists 49
4 Darwin and the proliferation of species concepts 78
5 The division of conceptual labor solution 113
6 Species and the metaphysics of evolution 145
7 Meaning, reference and conceptual change 178
8 Conclusion 205
Bibliography 221
Index 231
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